and selfish -one of the reasons why Germany lost the war, and likely to bankrupt the state unless checked. It was an extension of the Rentenkampfneurosen triggered by Bismarck's stick-and-carrot attempts to counter the influence of socialism by introducing progressive social insurance, 9 and resisted by the majority of doctors who saw it as a 'malingerers' charter'. For German psychiatry shell-shock was a moral matter. The nation had a duty not to encourage the labelling and recognition of psychiatric breakdown -the cost to the individual (condemned to a lifetime of psychiatric suffering and moral shame), to the army, which would be unable to deal with the manpower crisis, and to the exchequer, forced to pay the pensions bills, was unacceptable.
The official British doctrine on psychiatric breakdown in combat was enunciated by the War Office Commission of Inquiry into Shell-Shock, chaired by Lord Southborough, which reported in 1922.
10 Its conclusions were not substantially different from those reached in Germany. The Southborough committee was faced with a dilemma and one that it failed fully to resolve. Of all the witnesses before them, the one who would make the most lasting impact was Charles Wilson, who had been a Medical Officer on the Western Front and would later become Lord Moran and Churchill's doctor. Later in life he wrote The Anatomy of Courage, based on his first world war diaries and still on the reading lists at Shrivenham and Sandhurst today. Wilson came to believe that eventually the strongest nerves would crack under the strain of trench warfare. Men had only a limited 'bank of courage', which would inevitably be expended under the conditions of the Western Front. Eventually, every man had his breaking point.
11
But Moran's views were not those of the Committee, nor of the majority of the witnesses it heard. The Shell-Shock Commission generally continued to reflect traditional Edwardian values of courage and moral fibre.
12 Breakdown was not inevitable, some men made better soldiers than others and some were more resilient than others. Why, for example, had the number of shell-shock cases soared in 1916 and 1917 on the Somme and at Third Ypres? Was it simply that the psychological cost of modern war had become more than the mind could bear? Or was it due to the influx of the citizen armies and finally
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the Derby conscripts? Members of the Commission favoured the latter view. Turning their backs on the psychologists, including Myers himself, who refused to give evidence, they preferred views such as that of the future Lord Gort, VC -that shell-shock was a 'regrettable weakness', 'and never present in crack units'. The Commission concluded that the best way to prevent breakdown was to ensure that troops were properly trained, properly equipped and properly led.
13
This conclusion was supported by numerous observations of prisoners of war (POWs) and those who had received physical wounds. The view that neither group suffered much from combat neurosis, shell-shock or its equivalents was held with conviction and endorsed by several statistical studies.
14 Reflecting on his experiences, one first world war doctor later wrote: 'We rarely saw a "shell-shocked" soldier, a neurotic soldier, who had a wound. The wounded individual did not need a neurosis, he was out of the situation by virtue of his wound.'
15 Likewise, POWs did not 'need' a psychiatric illness, as they too were out of the war. 16 Like the German medical establishment, the Southborough Committee concluded that a medical label such as 'shell-shock' should not be applied to breakdown in battle. Such labels medicalized a non-medical condition and gave people a way of escaping their duties. The expression was banned, just as the Germans rejected the term Kriegsneurosen. It is one of the paradoxes of the history of psychiatric injury that just as both doctors and the military were turning against the expression 'shell-shock', and removing it from official discourse and classification, it was starting to occupy the central position in literary and cultural writing that it retains today. 17 Finally, there was a general conclusion across all the combatant nations that the method of treating psychiatric breakdown, which was based on the same principles as those used for the treatment of physical injuries, was a mistake. By the end of the war the policy of sending psychiatrically damaged servicemen down the line to a base hospital had been reversed. In came the new doctrine of 'forward psychiatry', according to which soldiers were treated as near to the front line as possible, in uniform and under military discipline. Soldiers were told that breakdown had a physiological basis -hence the introduction later of terms such as battle or combat fatigue to emphasize the transient nature of the problem. Treatment involved a couple of days' rest, food, clean clothing and sleep. After that the soldier was subtly, or more often not so subtly, encouraged to resume his military role, return to his unit, and prove himself a man.
18
So it is wrong to consider the first world war as the origins of our contemporary views on PTSD and combat breakdown. Instead, the conclusion was that breakdown could be avoided by better selection, training, leadership and morale. Any medical or psychiatric diagnostic label such as shell-shock provided an excuse for men to avoid their duties and was to be avoided. The real 'watershed' 19 in the conceptualization of war-induced breakdown was not reached until the second world war and the acknowledgment of the almost inescapable impact on the psyche of industrialized warfare, 20 and not until after Vietnam that a medical label for breakdown again found favour.
The perceived legacy of the first world war meant that the British began the second world war with policies on war breakdown that were intended to be more ruthless, and hence more effective, than those applied in the Great War. It was taken for granted that selection needed to be improved. Likewise, the so-called 'rewards' for mental breakdown needed to be removed, and so there would be no medical label, no discharges and no pensions payable during wartime for those suffering psychiatric breakdown.
21
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18 There is still a consensus that abandoning soldiers at rear hospitals and psychiatric institutions does little for morale, self-esteem or the prospects of recovery. Many did indeed spend lives afterwards characterized by bitterness, regret and self-loathing, as Ben Shephard's description of Spike Milligan's treatment in a rear hospital in Italy makes clear (Shephard, A War of Nerves, op. cit.). But we cannot be sure whether the opposite, keeping men in uniform near to the front line and returning them to the military environment in a few days, the doctrine of 'forward psychiatry', is better. This is because of the impossibility of conducting an unbiased assessment -commanders will always retain the less sick and more useful individuals, evacuating to the rear the more disturbed and less useful, who have a worse prognosis anyway. We cannot be sure whose interests are being served by 'forward psychiatry'-is it the individual or the military? E. But as the war progressed, it proved impossible for the democracies at least to sustain these policies. The conventional wisdom held that selection played a key role in preventing breakdown; yet by 1943 the Americans had concluded that this policy was an abject failure. Despite the introduction of psychiatric screening on a massive scale the problem was not solved, but seemed worse than before.
22 Selecting the 'right stuff' at induction did not prevent psychiatric casualties, but did create a serious manpower shortage. So in a vast natural experiment, many of those previously rejected for military service by the American psychiatrists were re-inducted into service, and the majority made satisfactory soldiers.
23
Removing the so-called 'rewards' did not prevent breakdown either, nor did it have popular support. As William Sargant observed after Dunkirk:
Just before the declaration of war a group of official advisory experts . . . had decided that war neuroses could best be abolished by simply pretending that they did not exist, or at least were not caused by a man's war experience but by an inherited predisposition or early childhood trauma. . . . they were entitled to no disability pension. . . . This ruling naturally caused their relatives as well as themselves great distress. . . . The pitiless World War I psychological theories that once freed from the Army these neurotics would stop 'subconsciously malingering' and recover at once proved to be arrant nonsense.
24
Opinion shifted away from a belief in prevention to the view that 'every man has his breaking point', and for the first time statistics appeared to support this view. Beginning with the US analysis of the setbacks in the North Africa campaign of 1942/43, these showed a robust link between the numbers of physical and psychiatric casualties. 25 As one increased so did the other, until eventually a unit was rendered combat-ineffective by psychiatric breakdowns. The Americans concluded that in the conditions of intense industrial warfare every man could indeed reach breaking point if he fought long or hard enough.
26
There was a second major shift as a result of the second world war, and this was in the understanding of combat motivation. Out went previous doctrines that men fought for moral reasons (patriotism, esprit de corps, pride and leadership, and so on), and in came the core role of small-group psychology. Specific motivations -those located in time and place, such as patriotism, religion and ideology -were replaced by more general explanations.
These new explanations were best articulated in three key texts that had their origins in surveys sponsored by the US War Department during the second world war. These studies, the 'Big Three' of combat motivation, profoundly altered views of combat motivation and demotivation. contact in intimate face-to-face association and co-operation. As Marshall wrote: 'I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or presumed presence of a comrade.' 31 Men fight because they belong to a group that fights. They fight for their friends, their 'buddies'. They fight because they have been trained to fight and because failure to do so endangers not just their own lives, but also those of the people immediately around them with whom they have formed powerful social bonds.
These views, and all three texts, remain standard doctrine. 32 It is not hard to see why they continue to be popular with professional militaries. We live in a non-ideological age and it is hard to see how Western militaries would recruit, let alone train and sustain, a modern professional army on ideology alone. Values such as Queen and Country have not vanished from the British military, but they are not prominent.
33
Although there is little sign of a waning of influence of the 'Big Three' studies in Staff Colleges, the same is not true in the scholarly literature.
34 In particular, the question of what made the Wehrmacht fight for as long as it did, and in the manner that it did, has been used to support the opposite case -that ideology, not primary groups, remains a prime source of combat motivation, even if opinions differ as to exactly which ideology is involved. The contrasting views of Omar Bartov on the barbarization of warfare in the East and Andreas Hillgruber on why the Wehrmacht continued to fight in defence of the Reich when militarily the cause was hopeless, are both examples of an Caution is certainly needed in interpreting Shils and Janowitz's article. 37 It is based partly on POW interrogations carried out during the war and it is plausible that captured soldiers would be more likely to emphasize the role of local social factors and their own military professionalism, than of National Socialist ideology. Indeed, Shils and Janowitz do accept the role ideology played amongst what they call the hard-core National Socialists, but estimate that the latter accounted for no more than 10-15 per cent of the fighting forces, mainly the junior officers.
But notwithstanding the scholarly criticisms, as far as modern military thinking is concerned there is little debate to be had. Teaching on what is called the 'moral component' of warfare at the British Staff College follows the generalist position, 38 rarely if ever emphasizing ideology. Albert Glass, the dominant figure in US military psychiatry in the postwar years, would conclude his career by writing that 'perhaps the most significant contribution of World War II military psychiatry was recognition of the sustained influence of the small combat group . . . "group identification", "group cohesiveness" . . . "the buddy system" '. 39 And over the years data has appeared on a sporadic basis which does not challenge, at least on the surface, this consensus. For example, a study of 'morale' in the Israeli army, based on interviews with 4723 participants in the Yom Kippur War, concluded that 'belief in the country, historical reasons for war, rightness of the government, and so forth, all were irrelevant'. 40 Few of the British service personnel I and my colleagues interviewed immediately after the 2003 invasion of Iraq claimed that lack of support for the war in the UK had influenced their own views of the war. Most constructed what they had done in professional terms, and, when asked to describe any negative views or experiences, chose to talk about matters such as equipment, food and kit, traditional gripes and the problem of friendly fire. The new views on combat motivation that emerged after the second world war also influenced views on combat breakdown. If soldiers fought for the primary group, then, the argument goes, soldiers ceased to fight when the primary group failed them. For Janowitz and Shils this happened when either they were never accepted by the primary group -because they were social misfits in the first place -or belonged to 'out' groups such as the Volkdeutsch, who surrendered in larger numbers because they made less identification with the primary group structures that defined the Wehrmacht. Alternatively, soldiers ceased to fight when the primary group itself permitted this, usually after some token or carefully scripted ritual of resistance to satisfy group honour before surrender. Other explanations of combat breakdown advanced during and after the second world war continued the same theme -the fundamental cause was disruption in group solidarity, either because it never formed or because of the circumstances of war. Immediately after the war, a US military psychiatrist wrote: 'The main characteristic of the soldier with a combat-induced neurosis is that he has become a frightened, lonely helpless person whose interpersonal relationships have been disrupted . . . he had lost the feeling that he was part of a powerful group'. 43 Grinker and Spiegel, whose observations on combat breakdown have now been rediscovered by contemporary psychiatrists, likewise included the primary group as a core motivation: 'The ability to identify with a group and the past history of such identification are probably the most important components of good motivation for combat '. 44 If primary groups were central to preventing breakdown in battle, preserving them was a priority for personnel policies in most of the combatant nations of the second world war, whether by accident or design. In both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, in so much as it was possible, men continued to serve with the same unit, even when that unit had received severe casualties. Units went into the line, and were withdrawn from the line, together. Furthermore, units were in it for the duration. Service was open-ended, until death, serious injury or the end of the war. The British and Americans were different, however, in that neither recognized 'combat neurosis' as such. The perceived legacy of the first world war meant that the German armies officially did not recognize psychological breakdown. In practice it seems that at a lower level various ruses and stratagems were used to permit the treatment of breakdown, even under a harsh disciplinary code. The Red Army refused to recognize combat breakdown as a medical problem in any shape or formonly psychosis was an acceptable psychiatric label, and even then most of those who left military service under that label probably died of deprivation and/or starvation in mental hospitals. Everything else was a failure of either moral character and/or political leadership, and was treated harshly.
45
One objection to the prevailing orthodoxy on primary groups and the prevention of breakdown is that the toll of casualties during prolonged combat meant that in practice losses were reinforced piecemeal and on an individual basis, which ought to have reduced the effectiveness of the primary group in sustaining combat motivation. Numerous personal accounts of US combatants in the war in Europe include some comment about how individuals would join units, go into combat and be killed before anyone even knew who they were. However, this is less of a challenge to orthodoxy than it appears, for the intense nature of the war and combat experience meant that, as Catherine Merridale's interviews with Soviet war veterans show, it does not take long to make strong friendships in these circumstances.
46
The second world war, therefore, overturned several of the doctrines developed after the first world war. First, the view that psychiatric breakdown could be prevented by better selection was abandoned. Second, theories of combat motivation and demotivation now emphasized not patriotism or ideology, but the key role of the small group. Third, even primary groups could not prevent breakdown in conditions of modern war -there was a close relationship between physical and psychiatric casualties and eventually even the best units would become combat-ineffective. Finally, although there remained an adherence to the principle that it was poor policy to give the phenomenon of psychiatric breakdown in combat a medical or psychiatric label (preferring terms such as battle or combat fatigue), refusing to grant legitimacy to such conditions by denying their existence, and disallowing pensions and/or discharge was impossible, at least for the democracies, to sustain.
But there remained a paradox even in the doctrines developed after the second world war. Men fight in groups, but if a group is left in the field too long, it too will become combat-ineffective. Keeping people together for as long as possible maximized the influence of social ties on combat motivation, but ran the risk of physical and psychological exhaustion if carried to extremes. And as the Cold War proceeded, the USA in particular became progressively more concerned about limiting casualties, and so the pendulum gradually shifted towards the latter priority -preserving the fighting strength. But this, too, was not without consequences, as the Vietnam conflict would reveal. The Americans began the Vietnam War with a change in personnel policy. In place of serving for the duration came DEROS, Date Expected Return from Overseas, which meant that soldiers only served a year in theatre. This was introduced in response to the demonstrated links between combat exposure and physical and psychological casualties, and was intended to reduce the latter. For a time this and the other changes implemented to reduce combat fatigue seemed to work. It may come as a surprise to learn that psychiatric casualties in theatre were actually lower than those in any previous American war, so much so that during the first few years of the conflict the psychiatrists thought that they had finally 'licked' the problem, as they put it in numerous articles at the time. The traumatized Vietnam veteran had become a political symbol used by opponents of the war. Robert Jay Lifton, Chaim Shatan and others, honourable men, opposed to the war, used the image of the disturbed veteran as a symbol of the insane war to crystallize opposition. Psychiatry was politicized, and out of it came a new stereotype of the Vietnam vet.
Another new phenomenon was the spectacle of soldiers now willingly admitting to atrocious behaviour -something new in the modern history of combat, trauma and memory. One of the reasons for the continuing debate about the conduct of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front is the problem of sources -there is not much direct testimony from those who took part. Few, if any, Wehrmacht soldiers would subsequently appear making tearful con- fessions and ritual pleas for forgiveness -amnesia, not remembrance, was the norm. But Vietnam changed that, so much so that we now have a new phenomenon, of soldiers admitting to atrocious acts which did not take place.
50
The 'Vietnam vet' had achieved the opposite of what the normal soldier had experienced -many had never identified themselves as part of the military, or bonded with their buddies or unit whilst they were in theatre, but only came to see themselves as 'Vietnam vets' and make common cause with their fellow veterans on their return: 'In a curious reversal of soldierly tradition, Vietnam veterans may have experienced more sustained fellow feeling with their comrades after leaving the war than they ever had while they fought it'.
51 However, it would be wrong to suggest that there was no primary-group cohesion in Vietnam. Instead, as war weariness developed and public support ebbed, group cohesion in theatre began to foster dissent rather than conformity with the goals of the military. Robert MacCoun used this to distinguish between group cohesion -the sense of solidarity with one's peers, from task cohesion -a collective commitment to accomplishing the tasks of the unit. By the end of the Vietnam conflict, US forces possessed the former, but not the latter.
52
Social cohesion may at times actively conflict with the aims of the military.
Vietnam also gave one more legacy, thanks to the inspired lobbying of Lifton and Shatan, and the change of climate in the USA. It led to a major shift in psychiatric thinking, one that remains in force today, and it gave us a new diagnosis -post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
There are considerable misunderstandings about what was new about the introduction of PTSD into the official psychiatric diagnostic canon in 1980. It was not the first acceptance of the psychiatric cost of war and trauma. What PTSD changed was the interpretation of why. Until then it was assumed that if you broke down in battle, and the cause was indeed the stress of war, then your illness would be short-lived. And if it wasn't, then the cause was not the war, but events before you went to war. At the risk of over-simplification, the dominant school of psychiatric thinking from the latter half of the nineteenth century to the latter half of the twentieth said the reason was hereditary. It was one's constitutional inheritance, expressed either as degeneration at the beginning of the century or genetics at its end, that determined most chronic psychiatric disorders. Freud and the founders of psychoanalysis preferred to emphasize events during the first few years of life, but the conclusion was much the same. Your cards were marked long before you joined the services. So if you did break down in war, but never recovered, then the real cause was not the war, but either your genetic inheritance or your upbringing -the problem was you. The war was merely the trigger. This general view held good for the first half of the century, began to be eroded by the experiences of the second world war and the literature on concentration camp survivors, and was finally challenged by the Vietnam War.
What was new about PTSD was therefore not the claim that war caused psychiatric casualties. The manpower crisis of 1917, the pensions bill that threatened the Weimar economy, or the Veterans' Administration hospitals that filled rapidly after the first world war, proved that beyond dispute. The new orthodoxy was that long-term psychiatric casualties were no longer the fault of genes or upbringing, but the insanity of war itself. In Pat Barker's Regeneration trilogy the author has Rivers musing that he did not know anything that distinguished those who broke down from those who did not, with the subtext that the war itself was to blame. But this is viewing history from our post-PTSD perspective -Rivers himself said no such thing, and like most of his professional contemporaries, did not believe it. It was not until the second world war that Grinker and Spiegel would say something similar, and not until 1980 and the DSM III that this was enshrined in conventional psychiatric thinking.
With the arrival of PTSD, views on combat motivation and combat breakdown began to diverge. Military academics continued to instruct on the importance of the primary group, and military training remained centred on the creation of primary groups, often via the deliberate creation of adversity. Yet the new psychiatric concepts of breakdown in wartime now emphasized individual factors -most importantly the personal experience of battle trauma. The influence of the group, and the failure of the group, is largely ignored in contemporary psychiatric formulations of trauma-induced breakdown. PTSD is seen instead as the interaction between a person and his or her exposure to traumatic events. A recent much-cited meta-analysis of risk factors for PTSD deals entirely with individual risk factors, such as exposure to trauma, previous psychiatric history, gender, marital status and so on. Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 68 (2000) , 748-66. and PTSD largely ignores group factors -the Big Three being reduced to a solitary reference amongst 277 pages. 54 Even social support, lack of which is accepted as a risk factor in PTSD, is constructed in terms of how a person's social network acts to provide emotional support to the individual exposed to trauma. The reciprocity of the military concept of the primary group with its 'network of mutual obligation' 55 (my emphasis) is largely ignored. It is tempting to see this as part of a much wider social change -from the collective values and admiration for emotional reticence that sustained the war years and beyond to the increasing importance given to individual values and emotional fulfilment that began during the 1960s. 56 The key observations that underpin most contemporary thinking on combat motivation were developed after the second world war. Men fight not because of ideology, but because of their membership of the tight-knit, self-sustaining and self-supporting unit whose creation is the principal ambition of infantry training.
57 As Western militaries continue to shrink and rely more on technology than manpower, the so-called 'Revolution in Military Affairs', the standard views have, if anything, strengthened over time. This is the legacy of the work of Shils, Janowitz, Marshall and Stouffer. This social perspective continues to be important in modern military academies because it coincides with how the military increasingly sees itself -small numbers of volunteer professionals. Ideology is frowned on in favour of professionalism, and the role of emotions downplayed. And this view is supported by considerable empirical data. However, it would be wrong to extrapolate this to other circumstances, such as the conduct of the Wehrmacht in the East, or the 'Dirty War' waged by the Argentinian professional army against the left during the 1980s (see Robben, .
But the question of why men cease to fight has continued to evolve. This question has been asked in three different ways, or at least within three different discourses, and it is not surprising that they come to different conclusions.
The most powerful discourse in military teaching and writing sees breakdown in battle as the opposite of motivation to fight. Men cease to fight when Ever since the first world war the military have recognized the reality and challenge of psychiatric breakdown, not least because of its impact on manpower. From the Shell-Shock Commission onwards, breakdown has been seen by the military as in part a moral issue. Lord Moran felt that breakdown was not a shameful dereliction of duty, but only if it was earned. Informally, most modern armies still operate something like the same code today -if breakdown was the result of courage and/or serious combat exposure, then they are understanding and supportive, but if you collapsed without a shot being fired, facing nothing more than the rigours of the training ground, then you risk receiving little in understanding or compassion.
So for some military professionals men cease to fight not only because they are lacking in professionalism, leadership or comrades (in keeping with theories of social motivation) but also because of a failure of character (the moral perspective). Open uncoded assertions of this view are not common in public pronouncements, but remain influential in the informal value systems that operate in the armed forces, and also with some sectors of the public.
But the professional military view is also pragmatic and directed towards the fundamental goals of the military -a soldier who breaks down is failing in his duty, whilst leaving his comrades to continue to face adversity and danger.
58 Likewise, virtually all commanders, past and present, accept that fear is contagious. Breakdown in battle, for whatever reason, is indeed a threat to the integrity of the group, to the sense of interdependence and mutual obligation on which 'fighting spirit' depends. Zahava Solomon, an Israeli psychologist who has extensive knowledge of combat stress reactions and PTSD in the Israeli Defence Force, as well as being extremely sympathetic to the plight of the combat soldier, could still write in 1993 that 'senior commanders are understandably loath to give any kind of legitimacy to a phenomenon that has the potential to undermine the fighting power of the whole army'. 59 Military culture, past and present, stigmatizes psychiatric disorder, but not just for reasons of prejudice. 58 Frederic Manning's 'Middle Parts of Fortune', one of the best fictional accounts of war, makes clear that it was not just the leadership, but the other ranks, in this case British servicemen in the first world war, who were not sympathetic to those who did break down in battle because it merely increased the danger to those remaining. The exception would be those who had, as Moran put it, 'done one's bit'. Professor Ian Palmer, who has the distinction of being both a qualified psychiatrist and a long-serving member of UK Special Forces, addresses the same point. Ian Palmer, 'The Emotion that Dare not Speak its Name? ', British Army Review, 132 (2003) , 31-7. 59 Zahava Solomon, Combat Stress Reaction. The Enduring Toll of War (New York 1993) . 60 Anyone who has had contact with the modern military will recognize the above. As an exemplar, the following 1993 memo from the UK Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff was dis-tion, either as war pensions or via personal injury litigation, is available -the latter can be generous. The previous paragraph is a fair summary of contemporary management of psychological trauma. Many will feel comfortable with it. Few will recognize, however, that the current ascendancy of the psychological approach to trauma represents another swing of the pendulum. The Southborough committee tentatively in 1922 and the Horder Committee emphatically in 1939 would have argued that our current policies represent not progress, but the reverse. Psychiatric breakdown after battle once again has a medical name -PTSD. The principles of 'forward psychiatry' seem to have been forgotten. And the financial rewards for psychiatric injury run the risk of providing further perverse incentives for ill health.
It seems clear there is no 'best' method for both preventing and managing psychological trauma arising from military service. Indeed, prevention and management are not always compatible. Perhaps the Southborough/Horder committee approach would lead to the smallest number of psychiatric casualties, but at the cost of misery and injustice to many of those who despite everything still break down. At present the balance has shifted towards individual rather than collective approaches. There is probably a lack of support for the population approach advocated by Southborough/Horder, and a preference to emphasize the provision of care, support and compensation for each individual victim of trauma, even if it could be shown that this adds to their numbers. But at other times, when different value systems emphasized reticence and resilience rather than individual identities, goals and emotional expression, the opposite was true.
There is no universal explanation why men fight, or why they break down in battle. Historians will always be better placed to analyse the complex factors, specific to time and place, that explain the particular, such as the French defeat of 1940, Tobruk or the Fall of Singapore. And when they turn to the social sciences for assistance on understanding motivation and demotivation, they will encounter an ever-changing mixture of social, moral, pragmatic and psychological theories. Rather than being universal truths about how men fight, and cease to fight, these are themselves historical material in their own right. 
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